Showing posts with label Book Review. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Book Review. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 23, 2014

Review of The Centrist Manifesto by Charles Wheelan and a Meditation on Third Party Politics in America

The Centrist Manifesto by Charles WheelanCharles Wheelan is the latest in a long line of would-be political reformers who have looked at the two party duopoly in the United States, found it wanting, and proposed the creation of a new third party as the solution. He outlines his strategy for a Centrist Party in his 2013 book  The Centrist Manifesto and continues to beat the drum on his website/blog The Centrist Project.

There is much to like in Wheelan's Centrist Manifesto. First and foremost, he does not fall into the usual trap befalling most third party fantasists - challenging the Republican/Democrat duopoly by running a candidate for President of the United States as a means to popularize and organize the party. Wheelan notes some of the historical challenges facing third parties:
"Conventional wisdom suggests that the American political system is hostile to all third parties. That is wrong. The system is hostile to third parties emerging from the political fringe—the Green Party, for example. These parties do not win elections because they represent relatively small, deeply ideological segments of the population. In fact, they often have a counterproductive effect. Ralph Nader almost certainly cost Al Gore the election in 2000, the pathetic irony being that the Green Party he was supposedly representing ended up worse off as a result of his campaign. When these fringe parties appear, potential supporters must choose between making noise and making a difference." - Charles Wheelan - The Centrist Manifesto (p. 25) - Kindle Edition 
True enough, as far as he goes, but Wheelan does not quite connect the dots on just how truly hostile the American political system is to third party efforts. In particular, he fails to note the pointless futility of third party presidential campaigns. If third party presidential efforts are not completely irrelevant, it's only because of their potential to be spoilers.

Friday, June 17, 2011

On China by Henry Kissinger - Review

One would be hard pressed to point to any relationship between two countries that will have greater global impact over the coming decades than the relationship between the United States and China. We would be equally hard pressed to find a better guide to understanding and explaining the historical foundation, current status and future prospects of that intricate, evolving and potentially brittle relationship than Henry Kissinger.

Intellectual, academic, author, consultant to private and public leaders in both countries, and most significantly, as National Security Adviser and Secretary of State to Presidents Nixon and Ford, Kissinger was arguably the primary actor whose performance on the international stage shaped the current state of Sino-American relations.

The name of Henry Kissinger's new book is "On China". A more accurate title might be "On Sino - American Relations - A Handbook for US and Chinese Diplomats and Leaders".

In the preface and prologue Kissinger is explicit about his intentions:
"This book is an effort... to explain the conceptual way the Chinese think about problems of peace and war and international order, and its relation to the more pragmatic, case-by-case American approach... American exceptionalism is missionary... Chinese exceptionalism is cultural... A primary focus of this book is the interaction between Chinese and American leaders since the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949."
Kissinger hits the mark. It is well written in an easily accessible style that does not require prerequisite knowledge of Chinese history or culture. Yet by simple virtue of its 530 page length, breadth and depth, the book requires a reader to make a commitment and bring a strong desire to understand the historic and cultural foundation on which current Sino-American relations are built.

It is only in the last chapter and epilogue that Kissinger explains why it is vitally important for Americans (and Chinese) to make the effort to understand the cultural and psychological differences in our respective approaches to foreign relations. These differences have in the past and may again in the future lead to misunderstandings, distrust, unintended consequences and tragedy.

I suggest that anyone wondering whether to commit to the effort required by this tome to read the epilogue first. It doesn't give anything away, but it does raise the stakes and correctly frames the context needed to appreciate the rest of the book. I'll revisit the epilogue later in the review.

"On China" is organized chronologically, beginning with the early history of China and ending with a look into her immediate future. Although it is structured as a historical timeline, it is not a conventional history nor does it pretend to be comprehensive. The history is offered as a framework for understanding the roots of the Chinese world view and (if we accept Kissinger's premise) as the keys to unlocking and understanding contemporary Chinese diplomatic approaches to managing US relations.

Kissinger cites ancient Chinese texts and thinkers like Sun-Tzu and Confucius to compare and contrast American and Chinese approaches to international diplomacy. Throughout the arc of post revolutionary Chinese history, Kissinger repeatedly applies these ancient texts and principles to explain the contemporaneous Chinese attitudes and actions. In this manner he illustrates recent historic and current events including the Korean War, the Mao/Nixon/Kissinger initiatives to restore relations, two Vietnam wars and even the current currency/trade negotiations.

Here I'll offer two of many examples:

In Chapter 1 - The Singularity of China Kissinger invokes a 14th Century Chinese novel:
"The famous opening of "The Romance of the Three Kingdoms", a fourteenth-century epic novel... evokes this continuous rhythm: "The empire long divided, must unite; long united must divide, thus it has eve been." Each period of disunity was viewed as an aberration... The fundamental precepts of Chinese culture endured, test by the strain of periodic calamity."
Having established this cultural perspective early in the book, Kissinger invites us to consider the outlook of contemporary Chinese leadership as still embracing this perspective. The rapid rise of contemporary China is thus considered by their leadership as simply a return to the natural order of things. Viewed through this prism, the relatively short multi-century period of foreign imperialism, civil war, disunity, and revolution becomes just another instance of a "temporary aberration". It is instructive to note that the time-frame of this most recent "temporary aberration" in the long arc of Chinese history is roughly comparable to the period of time comprising the entire history of the United States.

Then in Chapter 8 - The Road to Reconciliation Kissinger recounts Chinese strategists advising Chairman Mao by relying on lessons from the same 14th century novel as a basis for reopening relations with the US in the face of Sino-Soviet border skirmishes:
"Ye Jianying proposed a far older precedent from China's own Three Kingdoms period, when following the collapse of the Han Dynasty, the empire split into three state striving for dominance. The states' contests were recounted in a fourteenth-century epic novel, The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, then banned in China. Ye cited the strategy pursued by one of its central characters as a template:'We can consult the example of Zhuge Liang's strategic guiding principle, where the three states of Wei, Shu, and Wu confronted each other. Ally with Wu in the east to oppose Wei in the north.'... The marshals went on to describe potential relations with the U.S. as a strategic asset."
Still in Chapter 1 - Kissinger explains the concept of "Shi" from the 2,000 year old writings of Sun Tzu:
"Hence the task of a strategist is less to analyze a particular situation than to determine its relationship to the context in which it occurs... The strategist must capture the direction of that evolution and make it serve his ends. Sun Tzu uses the word "shi" for that quality , a concept with no direct Western counterpart. In the military context, shi connotes the strategic thread and "potential energy" of a developing situation... To Sun Tzu, the strategist mastering shi is akin to water flowing downhill, automatically find the swiftest and easiest course... The Art of War articulates a doctrine less of territorial conquest than of psychological dominance; it was the way North Vietnam fought America."
Then in Chapter 18 - The New Millennium Kissinger show the concept of "Shi" being applied by current Chinese leadership to current events:
"The cultivation of harmony did not preclude the pursuit of strategic advantage. At a July 2009 conference of Chinese diplomats, Hu Jianto delivered a major speech assessing the new trends. He affirmed the first twenty years of the twenty-first century were still a "strategic opportunity period" for China. But in the wake of the financial crisis and other seismic shifts, Hu suggested that the shi was now in flux... If China guarded against potential pitfalls and managed its affairs diligently, the period of upheaval might be turned to its advantage."
Reading this section I cannot help but wonder at the complacency with which our current financial leadership (Fed Chairman Bernanke, Treasury Secretary Geithner) trivialize the financial control over our dollar and economy that we have ceded to China as a primary lender and holder of trillions of dollars our national debt. Nothing in Kissinger's book suggests that China will hesitate to use that leverage, even if it causes damage to their own economy, if they believe it necessary to protect their interest or simply gain advantage against the US in the years to come. Which, to my mind, makes it inevitable that it will indeed be used. But I digress.

Throughout On China Kissinger proceeds in this manner. First he outlines ancient texts including Confucian thoughts, Sun Tzu's Art of War, Ming Dynasty strategies for "using barbarians to check barbarians ", Han Dynasty tactics to use "five baits" to manage barbarians [foreigners], the game of "surrounding pieces" known as "Wei Qi" or "Go", and the pervasive perception afforded by millennia of Chinese cultural exceptionalism. Then he shows how these ideas and attitudes have been in the recent past and continue now to be practically applied by Chinese leadership to international relations in the modern era.

Kissinger concludes with a warning. The failure to understand the differences in strategy and tactics applied by China and the US in international relations can lead to misunderstandings with tragic consequences. In chapters 4 and 5, he contends this is exactly what happened in Korea:
"In China's conflicts with both the United States and the Soviet Union, Mao and his top associates conceived of the threat in them of a wei qi concept - that of preventing strategic encirclement. It was in precisely these most traditional aspects that the superpowers had the most difficulty comprehending Mao's strategic moves... Mao was determined to prevent encirclement by any power or combination of powers,regardless of ideology, that he perceived as securing too many wei qi "stones" surrounding China, by disrupting their calculations. This was the catalyst that led China into the Korean War..."

" ... When the Chinese view of preemption encounters the Western concept of deterrence, a vicious circle can result: acts conceived as defensive in China may be treated as aggressive by the outside world; deterrent moves by the West may be interpreted in China as encirclement. The United States and China wrested with this dilemma repeatedly during the Cold War; to some extent they have not found a way to transcend it."
Which brings us to the epilogue - where Kissinger turns his eyes from looking back to looking forward and applying the lessons learned. The epilogue may be the rasion d'etre for the book. Here Kissinger asks the question "Will History Repeat Itself?" - clearly fearing it might, and perhaps hoping his book points to a way of avoiding the future he fears.

The history that Kissinger hopes to avoid is not the recent Sino-American history that consumes his attention in the first 500 pages. Instead he invokes pre-World War I Europe where an emerging unified Germany challenged the preeminence of the dominant superpower of the age - the United Kingdom. He cites the "Crowe Memorandum" written in 1907 by a senior official in the British Foreign Office. In this memorandum (characterized by Kissinger as "brilliant") Crowe argues that future conflict is inherent in the relationship of the two powers.
Crowe concluded that it made no difference what goal Germany avowed. Whichever course Germany was pursuing, "Germany would clearly be wise to build as powerful a navy as she can afford." And once Germany achieved naval supremacy, Crowe assessed, this in itself - regardless of German intentions - would be an objective threat to Britain and "incompatible with the existence of the British Empire."
History would seem to judge him prescient. The obvious comparison is to a rising China building as powerful a military and economy as it can, and begs the question whether China similarly becomes an objective threat to the United States - "regardless of intentions".

Perhaps Kissinger sees this book as his own modern day "Crowe Memorandum". By calling attention to the potential dangers inherent in the relationship, he hopes to head off a similar catastrophic conflict. Certainly he finishes with suggestions to avoid such a fate, and strikes a hopeful (or wishful) note:
"I am aware that the cultural, historic, and strategic gaps in perception that I have described will pose formidable challenges for even the best intentioned and most far-sighted leadership on both sides. On the other had, were history confided the mechanical repetition of the past, no transformation would ever have occurred. Every great achievement was a vision before it became a reality. In that sense, it arose from commitment, not resignation to the inevitable."
Growing up in the shadow of the Vietnam war, I have mixed feelings about Henry Kissinger and in particular the role he played in the Nixon and Ford administrations. That said, I judge this book a success by the standards he set out in the preface, as well as by my own lofty expectations.

Reading it has changed the way I look at China, our historical relationship, and the issues confronting us today and in the future.

Recommended.


Thanks to Trish and TLC Book Tours for the opportunity to read the book and write this review. This is my second review for TLC (first here) and I received a free copy of On China (without preconditions on content) to write this review.

Check out the tour home page linked here. I was a little late, but made a point of not reading any blog or mainstream media reviews prior to completing this work. I am looking forward to comparing notes with other "On China" Virtual Tour Calendar and Reviews linked here:

Wednesday, May 11th: Man of La Book

Thursday, May 12th: Mark’s China Blog

Tuesday, May 17th: Inside-Out China

Wednesday, May 18th: Lisa Graas

Sunday, May 22nd: Rhapsody In Books

Tuesday, May 24th: Bookworm’s Dinner

Wednesday, May 25th: Pacific Rim Shots

Thursday, May 26th: Asia Unbound

Monday, May 30th: Hidden Harmonies China Blog

Tuesday, May 31st: Wordsmithonia

Wednesday, June 1st: Lit and Life

Thursday, June 2nd: ChinaGeeks

Wednesday, June 8th: Power and Control

Thursday, June 9th: Marathon Pundit

Friday, June 10th: Rundpinne

Monday, June 13th: Booker Rising

Friday, June 17th: Divided We Stand United We Fall

EDITS & UPDATES: - Fixing typos as I find them, and adding links to other reviews as they are completed.

Divided and Balanced.™
Now that is fair.

Tuesday, December 07, 2010

Game Change - Book Review and Blog Backwash

When I received an e-mail invitation from Trish Collins to write a review of Game Change for TLC Virtual Book Tours, I eagerly accepted (once I determined that Trish was not some advanced form of automated spam). I was intrigued by the concept of a book tour in the "cloud" and appreciate the opportunity to participate. Moreover it was a good excuse to read a book that I knew about, was interested in, but missed with its initial hard cover publication earlier this year.

The best way to review a book is to read it without any preconceived notions. To simply pick up a book, open the cover, dive in and form an opinion without first being influenced by what others think. That was impossible with Game Change.Extensively excerpted before publication, it was widely reviewed in mainstream media, praised and reviled across the blogosphere.

The authors claim to offer a unique inside view of the 2008 presidential campaign. This was a topic of intense interest and the focus of my blogging efforts here and at Donklephant. As such, I entered the world of Game Change lugging a trunkload of preconceived notions.

Carrying that load of baggage, I am not going to approach this review by walking directly through the front door masquerading as an objective reviewer. Instead I'll just beg The Reader's indulgence as I circle around back, sneak in through a side entrance and drag all this excess baggage with me.

Game Change by John Heilemann and Mark Halperin, promises an "insider" perspective informed by two years of hindsight and developed from extensive interviews of anonymous sources close to the 2008 campaigns. By contrast, my perspective of the election was that of an outsider with an agenda trying to understand the meaning, motivations, and in a small way even shape the outcome of the 2008 presidential election from this obscure corner of the blogosphere. Here I noted and commented on many of the strategies, spin, and narratives promoted by the very campaign insiders who were the sources and characters featured in this book. Comparing and contrasting their perspective with mine as documented on this blog is what I found most compelling about Game Change.

First, a note on the books central stylistic conceit, the omniscient narration that makes the book so readable, while simultaneous raising doubts about its credibility. Harper-Collins promoted the book as “a sweeping, novelistic, and ultimately definitive portrait” of the 2008 race. Sweeping? Certainly. Definitive? History will be the judge. Novelistic? Indeed, and there is the rub.

Is a docudrama a documentary? Can a historical novel be history? Game Change is a novelization of the 2008 campaign. In the first paragraph of the first page of the prologue we are confronted with the central dilemma of this narrative choice.
"Barack Obama jerked bolt upright in bed at three o’clock in the morning. Darkness enveloped his low-rent room at the Des Moines Hampton Inn; the airport across the street was quiet in the hours before dawn. It was very late December 2007, a few days ahead of the Iowa caucuses... Obama always slept soundly, like the dead. But now he found himself wide awake, heart pounding, consumed by a thought at once electric and daunting: I might win this thing... as Obama sat there in the predawn stillness, the implications of the events he saw unfolding hit him as never before. He didn’t feel ecstatic. He didn’t feel relieved. He felt like the dog that caught the bus. What was he supposed to do now?"
Barack Obama is alone in his room in a motel in Des Moines - and yet we are treated to every detail of his actions and the very thoughts and emotions inside his head. So... exactly who did Halperin and Heilemann interview to glean these detailed insights? Certainly this paragraph grabbed my attention and drew me into the story - exactly as intended. It also flipped an internal switch of recognition - not as a journalistic report on the election, but rather as a novel.

This is docudrama, and on that level, this book works exceedingly well. When finished, I appreciated the read as a well crafted dramatization of the 2008 campaign. In a new afterword for this paperback edition, the authors defend their journalistic/creative decision:
"Equally perplexing were the qualms in some quarters concerning our reporting methods. From the outset, we knew that if Game Change achieved any substantial degree of success, we would be held to high standards of journalistic integrity and accuracy - and we conduct ourselves throughout the research and writing of the book determined to exceed them. In grating our sources anonymity and rendering the narrative in a omniscient voice, we were doing nothing novel; we were following in a tradition of countless esteemed non-fiction writers." (P 438)
Perhaps. But I nevertheless found it to be more akin to a novel "based on a true story" than a non-fiction report. Undoubtedly there are truths to be gleaned in these pages, as with any good novel. But when I put the book down, I was not sure whether I should consider it anything more than a page-turning pot boiler.

Rather than considering the value of the narrative on stylistic term, let us take the measure of this book using another scale, one suggested by the authors' themselves. In the Author's Note that precedes the prologue the authors explain their purpose:
"We have tried to address the multitude of vital questions that daily journalism (and hourly blogofying) obsessed over briefly and then passed by, or never grappled with in the first place. How did Obama, a freshman senator with few tangible political accomplishments, convince himself that he should be, and could be, America's first African American president? What role did Bill Clinton actually play in his wife's campaign? Why did McCain pick the unknown and untested governor of Alaska as his running mate? And who is Sarah Palin, really?"
So by that very standard, did this book succeed? As one of the "blogofyers" of the election, I'll approach the question on exactly the author's terms. By directly comparing how the author's omniscient insider historical "political player" perspective on these very questions compared to my contemporaneous outsider "D-list" blogger perspective.

"How did Obama, a freshman senator with few tangible political accomplishments, convince himself that he should be, and could be, America's first African American president?"

GAME CHANGE: "Getting to Yes"
Within Obama’s operation, “the options” became a code phrase, a reference to three live possibilities: launching a presidential run, bolstering his stature in the Senate with an eye toward the VP slot in 2008, or returning to Illinois to run for governor—with a presidential bid so far remaining at the bottom of the option pile. (P 32)

Like Obama, the pollsters in the room had been grappling with the issue all year long. Time and again they would hear in their focus groups expressions of unease about Obama’s greenness and his barren résumé. “He’s too new,” ­people would say. “Why doesn’t he wait fours" "Why doesn't he just take the vice presidency?" "He doesn't know about foreign policy." (P 118)

Powell had his own questions for Obama, but the main one was: Why now? You don't have much of an experience base, Powell pointed out. You're new to the Senate, you have an interesting but limited resume from before that. So again, why now? I think I might have what the country needs today, not four or eight years down the line, Obama responded. I think it might be my time. (P69)

He formally launched his campaign six weeks later, on February 10, 2007, on the steps of the Old State Capitol in Springfield, Illinois... The speech he delivered laid out all of the themes that would carry through 2007 and beyond... "It's time to turn the page." (P 74)
DIVIDIST: (February 11, 2007)
"Barack used the word "generation" at least 12 times in the 20 minute speech. Apparently he is building his campaign on on a foundation of Baby Boomicide. One has to ask - why the generational focus? I submit, that this is a realistic political calculation by a young, self-assured, very smart, very ambitious politician, who understands that his path to the presidency requires a stepping stone as Vice-President. A key element in the selection of any Vice-Presidential candidate, is to identify what constituency they bring to a ticket. From a purely political perspective, it is interesting to ask - Exactly what constituency does Barack Obama bring to a Democratic ticket... Barack can bring a generational constituency, if he can mobilize a demographic block that historically cannot even be bothered to vote, then Barack would be a formidable addition to any Democratic ticket. This is a campaign to capture that constituency and trade it for a spot on the ticket."
I never believed that Obama considered his run to be a serious effort to win the presidency in 2008. His resume was just too weak. My perspective was exactly the perspective of the focus groups described in the book. I thought this was always a campaign to cross the stepping stone of a vice president role on the way to a presidential run four or eight years hence. But if the peek that the authors of Game Change offer us into the mind of Barack Obama is accurate - he ran only to be president and only to win. The VP role was never the objective. On the question of his motivation, I did not see from the outside what the authors say was in his head. History would indicate they were right.

"What role did Bill Clinton actually play in his wife's campaign?"

GAME CHANGE: "Two for the Price of One"
"Backstage, Bill paced back and forth, taking their old friend Terry Shumacher about the uphill climb they were facing. We could turn this around if we had the traditional eight days between Iowa and New Hampshire. he said. "I'm just not sure we have enough time" The first-person plural was no slip of the tongue. For a year Hillary had been content to keep her husband at arms length, but now she pulled him close. Nobody knew New Hampshire the way Bill Clinton did...

While Hillary was trying to dance delicately through a minefield of racial sensitivities, Bill was working the remote Western and northern part of the sate. At a townhall meeting at Dartmouth College, he uncorked the argument that he and Penn and been longing to make for a year. Horse voiced and finger wagging, he ripped into Obama's claim of antiwar purity and the media's claims of letting those claims go unchallenged.... Give me a break" the former president moaned. "The whole thing is the biggest fairy tale I've seen!"...

It was after ten o'clock when the excitement finally washed over the room. The networks had certified Hillary's win. The candidate came and hugged everyone. "I felt it all day," she said. Bill boasted how his "fairly tale attack" had been pivotal to the outcome - it had held down Obama's margins in Hanover. (P 178-189)
DIVIDIST: (January 30, 2008)
A Fairy Tale for Our Time
Long had the House of Clinton practiced the ancient arts, honed their dark craft and schooled in the political weirding way. Long had the Lord King Clinton ruled over the Land of the Dems and held the people entranced under a spell of power and guile.

“Behold your Queen”
King Clinton exclaimed “For I am passing my power to her and she shall rule over you as did I. Accept her and love her as you loved me.” And the Dems were afraid and did bow before them.

The children of the Dems flocked to the hero Obama and said “You must free us from this curse!” and so he went forth to battle the Queen of the Hill. And it came to pass that the great hero broke the spell and set free the serfs of Iowa and Carolina. The peasants pledged fealty to the hero and said “We will be your army, and we will be called the Obamites.”

And the scribes and town criers sang his praises and told of his great deeds and of his victory and prophesied the death of the dark Queen until the day came that she cried out in anguish and defeat. But the King unleashed powerful wizards of special interest and once again cast his spell on the people of the Hampshires and Nevada and Lo! The people saw the Queen was not dead.
While my allegory in early 2008 did not predict the outcome correctly (I still thought he would wind up as Clinton's VP), I think it did a pretty good job of picking up on the sense of the race. While the dramatic staging and particulars to be found in Game Change is entertaining, I can't say that there was anything particularly new about Bill's role in the campaign that I did not see (at least at a general level) and comment on at the time.

GAME CHANGE: "Pulling Away and Falling Apart"
She thought Obama wasn't qualified to be commander in chief. And she thought the Republicans would destroy him in the fall, preying on his inexperience and insubstantiality, prying him open and disemboweling him. That morning her campaign had released a new ad in Texas that went direct to those points. Titled "3AM" it was concoction of Penn's drawn from a script he'd drafted a few day earlier on his laptop in a file called "gamechangers"...

There were sleeping children, the sound of a phone ringing , and a question: When an international crisis hits, who do you want picking up the receiver in the Oval Office? A shot of Hillary, assured and calm, phone to ear, provided the answer; Obama's name was never mentioned. Even so "3AM" was the first ad the Clintonites had run that challenged Obama's fitness for office...

After more than a year of battling Obama she'd concluded he was a cipher. In prepping for their debate a week earlier in Cleveland, she had argued with her staff over whether she should call him a "blank slate". We have to make people understand that he's not real." Obama's vast crowds , his wild-eyed devotees - it was a kind of mass hysteria." (P 230)
DIVIDIST (April 7, 2008):
Embracing Billary
"What is this 3 AM ad really all about? What does the "Clinton is ready on day one" meme really mean? The Clinton campaign code word is "experience". The McCain campaign uses the same word while the Obama campaign prefers "judgment". But neither the words "experience" or "judgment" capture the gestalt of that ad or its meaning.

The ad is being repeated because it is effective. It is effective for the simple reason we know exactly what we are getting with a Clinton administration. Net, net - it is not Hillary Clinton's experience we are talking it about. It is our experience with Team Clinton. We have already experienced eight years of a Clinton administration, and for most Americans, it was a good thing. Even more so in contrast to the subsequent eight disastrous years of the Bush administration. We had more peace, more prosperity, more rationality, better currency, better economy, and a better standing in the world. What's not to like?

After eight years of the mind numbingly incompetent, anti-intellectual, disingenuous, and incoherent Bush administration, it is easy to be nostalgic for a competent, smart, predictable, and articulate Clinton Redux. Even if it is a team effort. Especially if it is a team effort. And if a little bit of ruthless, cutthroat duplicity is part of the package? I am good with that. A far more dangerous delusion, is that there will be no duplicity in an Obama administration.

In contrast to the Clinton's, a prospective Obama administration is a cipher. There is simply not enough experience there to see it as anything but an unbreakable code whose meaning is fundamentally unknowable. Now I like Obama. I like the way he talks, and I like the way he thinks. It is easy to feel very good about an Obama presidency. That does not change the fact that no one can know what an Obama presidency will bring. He might be a great president. He might be a disaster.
By the time that 3AM ad ran, I was in full advocacy mode for Hillary Clinton on this blog. I didn't believe a Republican could win in 20o8, and very uncomfortable with turning over the White House to a President with as little executive experience as Barack Obama. Comparing these descriptions, there is little or nothing in the Game Change "insider" account about Bill Clinton's role in the campaign that I was not seeing reported from the outside at the time. However, the synchronicity of the two accounts, even the similar syntax, does beg an interesting question - Was I simply seeing the same thing as the Team Clinton campaign, or was I so sympathetic to the campaign, that I was simply picking up the messaging of Team Clinton and channeling it on the blog?

"Why did McCain pick the unknown and untested governor of Alaska as his running mate? "

GAME CHANGE: "Sarahcuda"
"The plan was always for McCain to shock the world his vice-presidential pick. For weeks his top advisers had been dreaming and scheming., touching bases and laying groundwork, secretly readying an announcement at once unconventional, unexpected, and unprecedented, which would throw the press and both parties for a loop and redraw the political map. The surprise that McCainworld intended to spring was a running mate named Joe Lieberman.

But then something happened on the way to the Republican convention in St. Paul - and presto chango, there was Palin. McCainworld's core conviction was that McCain's VP choice had to be a game changer. The campaign assumed... the three quarter of the electorate who were telling pollsters the country was on the wrong track and blaming the GOP would punish McCain at the polls. If McCain's running mate selection didn't fundamentally alter the dynamics of the race, it would be lights out.

That Sunday, August 24... Schmidt and Davis then placed a new option on the table: Sarah Palin. Sarah Palin's name had been on the longest of the long lists, but that was it. Davis told McCain that if he wanted to consider the governor of Alaska, he needed to phone here that night and ask her if she'd be willing to be vetted - and arrange to meet with her, pronto. McCain was impassive, but agreeable. "I'll call her." he said... On the evening of Wednesday, August 27, three days after McCain phoned Palin, she arrived at the airport in Flagstaff, Arizona...

Culvahouse spoke to McCain by phone. Overall the lawyer was impressed with how Palin handled herself, but he advised McCain that, compared to the alternatives, there were more potential landmines with Palin. "What's your bottom line?" Mc Cain asked. "john, High risk, high reward,." Culvahouse said. " You shouldn't have told me that. I've been a risk taker all my life."...

... although McCain didn't know much about Palin, what he knew, he liked. She reminded him a lot of himself: the outsider's courage, the willingness to piss all over her party . (He loved that she'd taken on that pork-barreler Ted Stevens, whom he despised.) He saw in Palin a way of seizing back and amplifying his own message of change - real change, not the bogus Obama version. "Trust your gut, John." Cindy told him, and McCain knew that she was right. McCain walked up to the deck outside his cabin, where Palin was waiting, and offered here the job."
DIVIDIST: August 26, 2008 & August 31, 2008
Back and Blogging
Biden will help give Obama credibility and he will be a very effective campaigner for Obama. However, the choice does leave McCain an opportunity to make a play for disgruntled Clinton supporters by selecting a woman for VP. There are plenty of good choices, Whitman, Fiorina, Hutchison, or my favorite - Alaska Governor Sarah Palin. It would be a smart move, but I doubt he will take my advice this time.

Pondering Palin
First, I never believed McCain would do this. But I am glad he did. Now, we have the potential of a real race. Palin could very well turn out to be a mistake. She could easily wilt under the kleig light glare of a national campaign. She may indeed have been inadequately vetted, which just means the real vetting is going to take place by the American people between now and the election. Which, by the way, is exactly how Obama was vetted during the primary season. McCain may indeed have made a rash decision, and she may prove to be a disaster to his campaign. But with a conventional Republican white bread choice, McCain was going to lose this anyway. Now the Republicans have a chance.

Elections are the only vetting process that matters. Obama clearly did not/does not have enough experience to justify becoming President based on his resume alone. However, he put himself in the spotlight of a campaign in front of the American people and convinced them (at least the Democrats) that he is ready to be President. That is the way Democracy works. He overcame his deficient resume with the voters. If selecting our leaders was only about resume, we would not need elections.

Sarah Palin will now go through the same process. Her resume is not appreciably better or worse than Obama’s. But she will now have to pass muster under an intense media glare in a campaign pressure cooker over the next two months. Then voters will decide if she is qualified to be VP with a resume no better that Obama’s. I don’t know how she’ll do. I hope she does well. We’ll see."
The narrative in Game Change relating the details of exactly how Sarah Palin was plucked from relative obscurity to find herself standing on a grand political stage next to John McCain is fascinating. However, I found little or nothing in the book about the rationale, the potential risk and reward, or even the likelihood of inadequate vetting for the Palin pick that was not already in the public discourse at the time and discussed on this blog. New details and a compelling narrative? Yes. But as far as any previously unknown revelation or insight into the decision or the process that was not apparent at the time? I didn't see it.

"Who is Sarah Palin, really?"

I am not going to quote anything from my blog on this question. First I don't think I've ever tried to answer this particular question, and moreover, I'm not even sure what it means. In 2008, as a sitting governor with a good handle on energy issues, I thought she could help McCain get elected, and with four+ years as VP, grown into a potential presidential role (Actually, I initially thought the same thing about Obama as related above).

Now - after having quit as governor, and capitalizing on the unrelenting media obsession by becoming a media star, I don't think that path remains open to her. Frankly I think she far prefers the new path she has cut for herself. She is playing the hand she was dealt, and playing it well.

That said, I don't know that Game Change answered that question either. They do offer a number of interesting anecdotes and observations - here one from the original publication, and another from the new Afterword:
"Seconds in Command"
The truth was, the McCain people did fail Palin. They had, as they promised, made her one of the most famous people in the world over-night. But they allowed her no time to plant her feet to absorb such a seismic shift. They were unprepared when they picked her, which made her look even more unready than she was. They banked on the force of her magnetism to compensate for their disarray. They amassed polling points and dollars off of her fiery chrisma, and then left her to burn up in the inferno of public opinion" (P 415)

"Afterword"
"With the exception of Obama himself, no one underwent a greater life change after the 2008 election than Sarah Palin. In July 2009, she abruptly quit the Alaska governorship, claiming cryptically that "only dead fish go with the flow," thereby trading in endless battles her state's legislature and series of expensive lawsuits for a glamorous career as a well-paid speaker, bestselling author, Fox News commentator, and Republican royalty-maker. Though Palin resisted immersing herself in the serious policy issues about which her lack of knowledge remains her greatest weakness, if she aspires to the presidency, she has kept her had in politics with cleverly timed endorsements and frequent flash communications to her fans through Twitter and Facebook. Even as polls have shown that majorities of Americans doubt her qualifications to serve in the Oval Office, she towers over every other Republican figure as a media magnet and rallier of the conservative base." (P440)
True and True. Well written and cleverly phrased. But if assessed against the objective the authors themselves set out to accomplish - to "address the vital question of... who is Sarah Palin?" - and to do so in a manner that was not addressed by contemporaneous media or bloggers at the time of campaign? A shot and a miss.

Perhaps others are finding something new and revelatory in these pages. I did not.

Look, the book is an enjoyable read, and well worth the investment in time and money for this new paperback edition. I recommend it. But in terms of the standards that the authors set for themselves, the book fails.

Finally, I cannot conclude this review without commenting on one tawdry and unforgivable aspect of the book - the treatment of Elizabeth Edwards.

It is clear that this book was anonymously sourced primarily by the operatives, campaign staff, aides, and professional politicos who managed the major campaigns. While not all emerged unscathed, to the extent that any sympathetic characters are to be found in Game Change - it is these campaign operatives. Whether they deserve that treatment is another matter. To a large extent, the authors reported their stories, through their eyes, and unsurprisingly, they told stories that made themselves look good. In the process, most of the politicians, candidates, their spouses, and competing campaign staff are made to look bad.

An artifact of the authors reliance on these sources is that the book often comes across as catty, petty, cynical and mean spirited. Nowhere more so than with Elizabeth Edwards. I won't excerpt the offending parts here, you can read them in the New York magazine article.

Now I didn't know her, I didn't know anyone who knows her, and I don't know what she was like to work for or with. That said, this is a woman who was working in the pressure cooker of a presidential campaign while dying of cancer and learning that the idealistic political crusader that she thought she was married to was, in fact, an empty suit and a narcissistic, lying, cheating shyster.

The book portrays her as a shrill, borderline insane, screaming banshee. If you cut through the novelistic embellishments and compensate for likely self-serving sources, her reported offenses distill down to being obsessed about her husband's campaign, and occasionally yelling and cursing out the campaign staff. Poor babies.

In the timeframe covered in the book Elizabeth Edwards is confronting the end of her marriage, her dreams and her life during the course of a presidential campaign. She deserved a more sympathetic and fair treatment. To that end, I'll leave her the last word - her last public words - a message she published on facebook as I wrote this review:
" You all know that I have been sustained throughout my life by three saving graces -- my family, my friends, and a faith in the power of resilience and hope. These graces have carried me through difficult times and they have brought more joy to the good times than I ever could have imagined. There are certainly times when we aren't able to muster as much strength and patience as we would like. It's called being human. But I have found that in the simple act of living with hope, and in the daily effort to have a positive impact in the world, the days I do have are made all the more meaningful and precious. And for that I am grateful. It isn't possible to put into words the love and gratitude I feel to everyone who has and continues to support and inspire me every day. To you I simply say: you know."
Rest In Peace Elizabeth Edwards.


Thanks to Trish and TLC Book Tours for the book and the opportunity to read and write this review. Check out the tour home page linked here. Sorry about being a little late, I made up for it by running a little ridiculously long.

The Game Change Virtual Tour Calendar and Reviews:

Monday, November 15th: Social Sense

Wednesday, November 17th: Deep Muck Big Rake

Wednesday, December 1st: Marathon Pundit

Thursday, December 2nd: Divided We Stand United We Fall

Monday, December 6th: Ruby Slippers

Monday, December 13th: Whiskey Fire

Wednesday, December 15th: Rude Pundit

Thursday, December 16th: Booker Rising

Friday, December 17th: Chaotic Compendiums

Tuesday, December 21st LitBrit

Tuesday, December 21st Cogitamus

EDITS & UPDATES: - Fixing typos as I find them, and adding links to other reviews as they are completed.

Divided and Balanced.™
Now that is fair.

Tuesday, July 14, 2009

Robert McNamara Remembered -
lessons from a liberal technocrat

"I come to bury Caesar not to praise him.
The evil that men do lives after them;

The good is oft interred with their bones.

So let it be with Caesar."

- William Shakespeare (Marc Antony's eulogy)
Marc Antony's intent was masked by his words, and the words that Shakespeare put in his mouth are the opposite of what Shakespeare knew to be true. As a rule - it is the good that men do that live after them. We are reluctant to speak ill of the dead. We prefer to celebrate the song and dance man, but forget the child molester and drug abuser. So let it be with Michael. But what of Robert? Almost lost among the Michael Jackson Memorial media circus last week was the notable death of Robert McNamara. Perhaps he is an exception to the rule of remembering only the good men do.

Robert McNamara died in his bed on Monday July 6th. Words like those of Shakespeare's Antony, words crafted to deceive, words considered only as a means to a political end, are words that seem particularly apropos when remembering Robert McNamara.

McNamara has been a frequent topic on this blog. The recurring theme and the unanswered question: What did he know to be true about the Vietnam War, when did he know it, what actions did he take and fail to take as a consequence, and why did he chose not to tell the American people what he knew? It seemed an important lesson for today. From a September, 2006 post:
In 1995, Robert McNamara (widely referred to as "the architect of the Vietnam War") writing in his memoir "In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam", revealed that as early as 1967 (with 25,000 American dead) he no longer believed that America could win the war in Vietnam, and as a direct consequence of expressing that view, resigned (or was fired) from the LBJ administration. This McNamara quote is excerpted from Harold P. Ford's analysis "Thoughts Engendered by Robert McNamara's In Retrospect":
"We were wrong, terribly wrong... Enemy morale has not broken . . . . It appears that [the enemy] can more than replace his losses by infiltration from North Vietnam and recruitment in South Vietnam. . . . Pacification has if anything gone backward. As compared with two, or four, years ago, enemy full-time regional forces and part-time guerrilla forces are larger; attacks, terrorism and sabotage have increased in scope and intensity. . . . In essence, we find ourselves--from the point of view of the important war (for the [hearts and minds] of the people)--no better, and if anything worse off. This important war must be fought and won by the Vietnamese themselves. We have known this from the beginning . . ." Robert McNamara -"In Retrospect" (pp. 262-263).
Neither McNamara nor LBJ chose to share that insight with the American public. Ultimately it took 50,000 American lives for a majority of Americans to learn that their government could not be trusted on the reasons for, nor the "light at the end of the tunnel" progress in, Vietnam. It is reasonable to posit, that if McNamara had recognized in 1968 that his loyalty was owed first to the American people, and second to the LBJ administration, had communicated what he knew then to the American people, we might have seen a better end, a quicker end, and fewer deaths and casualties in Vietnam.
McNamara had a bit more nuanced view of his own actions. While he acknowledged his analysis and the consequent administration decisions on Vietnam were dead wrong, while he regretted his support of that war, he remained unapologetic about putting loyalty to his president ahead of his obligations to the American people. He had no problem rationalizing his decision to keep the American people ignorant of what he knew to be true about that war.

The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer was one of the few broadcast news outlets not distracted by the Michael Jackson death-a-palooza, and explored this very question on the night of his death. An excerpt:



The full segment includes interviews with documentarian Earl Morris and biographer Deborah Shapley. Also interesting, the complete 1995 interview between Macneil and McNamara, as well as a spirited round table discussion between a young Senator John McCain, George McGovern, McGeorge Bundy and Robert Scheer, also available on the PBS site:

Recommended viewing.

The picture of Robert McNamara that emerges from the interviews, the book and the documentary differs from contemporaneous reporting when his memoir was published. There is no contrition on display. No quest for redemption is in evidence as some suggested at the time. This is the technocrat, the policy wonk, the engineer poring over the wreckage of an airplane he designed and offering observations on why it crashed and burned. His hope for his memoir:
"I hope what it will do is cause us to examine what happened then and try to prevent it in the future."
Examining the McNamara lessons can drive a blogger to drink. So let us start at our favorite watering hole, The Repeating History Bar. Here we find another senior administration official choosing personal loyalty to a president over their duty to the American people. Many have compared McNamara to Rumsfeld. I have done so myself. But in the context of the lessons learned from McNamara and Vietnam, the more apt comparison is Colin Powell. From a more recent post:
Colin Powell enabled the GWB administration to garner the support needed to put us on this course [in Iraq]. I suspect that Colin Powell, out of misplaced loyalty, like McNamara on Vietnam, failed to be forthright and honest with the American people about Iraq. Should Colin Powell, in future memoirs, like McNamara, proclaim that he knew that the Iraq occupation was a wrong policy, he will, like McNamara, have blood on his hands for every day that passes between the time that he recognized the mistake, and the day he finally comes clean with the American people. It took McNamara 27 years. How long will it take Powell?"Make no mistake. It was a critical decision point, a nexus in history, when in 2002 Colin Powell walked into the Oval office to advise the President. As he related to Tim Russert:
"when I took it to the president and said, “This is a war we ought to see if we can avoid,” I also said and made it clear to him, 'If, at the end of the day, it is a war that we cannot avoid, I’ll be with you all the way.' That’s part of being part of a team."
Powell understood that this was the wrong path. Powell understood that the rationale for action in Iraq did not pass muster on the lessons he extracted from Vietnam, the Powell Doctrine. Powell could have told Bush that he did not support the policy and resigned. Instead Colin Powell enabled George W Bush to make the decision to prosecute the occupation, much like McNamara enabled LBJ to expand our footprint in Vietnam. Colin Powell sold the war to the American people. After Cheney and Bush, Powell is the man most responsible for the war decision.
That lesson went unheeded. How about another lesson? A cautionary tale about the hubris of having the "best and the brightest" liberal ideologues run the country:

ROBERT MACNEIL: You say you were prompted to write this book because you were heartsick at the cynicism, even the contempt with which people view their political institutions today. How did you think this book might dispel that cynicism?

ROBERT MCNAMARA: I hope it will explore why the leaders did what they did. My associates were properly described by that pejorative term, "the best and the brightest." They were young, intelligent, well-educated, hardworking, dedicated servants, they're people in their government, and they were wrong.

Now, I think, if our people understand that, then we can talk about, why were they wrong? How can we avoid similar errors in the future?

ROBERT MACNEIL: But as you document, if the best and the brightest that Kennedy and Johnson could muster year after year made the mistakes you admit and they refused to listen to their critics, to use your phrase, "were blind prisoners of their assumptions," and in the process sent nearly 60,000 Americans to their deaths, would that not confirm or deepen people's cynicism about government today?

ROBERT MCNAMARA: Well, no, I think -- I hope what it will do is cause us to examine what happened then and try to prevent it in the future.

The last administration did not learn from the lessons of McNamara. One wonders - Could our brand spanking new administration comprised of today's "best and the brightest" liberal ideologues learn anything from Robert? Perhaps they need no lessons, after all they are so supremely confident in their intellect and ability that they:
Nothing to worry about there.

Rest in Peace Robert McNamara.

Your political and intellectual heirs are in charge.

UPDATE: McNamara's favorite poem

A punctuation mark for the man and the post...



The Palace - Rudyard Kipling

"WHEN I was a King and a Mason - a Master proven and skilled
I cleared me ground for a Palace such as a King should build.
I decreed and dug down to my levels. Presently under the silt
I came on the wreck of a Palace such as a King had built."




Divided and Balanced.™
Now that is fair.


Friday, September 05, 2008

A palpable public mood for change. Or not.

As noted in a previous post, I read David Mayhew's "Divided we Govern" during my sea-faring holiday. This is a book I had intended to read for some time. It is a foundation work of scholarship on which we have built the divided government voting heuristic promoted in this blog.

The book is a bit of a tough slog for the casual reader, a group in which I include myself. I recommend reading it while trapped on sailboat in the middle of the Pacific Ocean for two weeks when you have little else to do. Working through extensive footnotes and supporting material that some would consider dry, perhaps arid, maybe even Sahara Desert-like, requires some perseverance. But Mayhew writes with clarity, and if you bring a curiosity of why things really get done (or don't) in Washington - it is fascinating.

There is a pervasive belief - a nugget of "conventional wisdom" - that if you want to "get things done" in Congress, whether legislation, investigations to clean up governmental abuses, or just promote "change", a single party must control the Presidency and both legislative branches to avoid gridlock. It certainly seems intuitively obvious that the the federal government would be more productive if it all branches are run by one party. David Mayhew proved this conventional wisdom flat wrong, at least in the modern era. He puts the proposition to the test by rigorously quantifying and analyzing all legislation and investigations (the two primary functions of Congress) from 1946-2002. First published in 1991, the book was updated with a second edition in 2005. This book is the seminal work that debunked the notion that the federal government functions more effectively with unified single party control.

Watching the ubiquitous blue "Change" signs waving at the Democratic convention and listening to McCain's born-again "Change" message at the Republican convention, I was reminded of another Mayhew theme in the book. In his data, he documents periods spanning many years, where Congress becomes very productive in what Mayhew calls a legislative and/or investigatory "surge". Having completely dismantled any consideration that single party government is correlated with these productive congressional eras, he speculates on other factors that might drive these legislative surges.

This portion of the book is considerably less rigorous statistically, but it is interesting and potentially directly relevant to what we are seeing in this 2008 election season. Specifically, Mayhew explores the notion that the primary pre-requisite for theses periodic legislative "surges" is a pervasive "public mood" demanding "change". He wrote this more than a decade before the Obama candidacy, but his analysis may be the key to unlocking one of the great puzzles of this election. What does "change" really mean in this context?

"... causes of legislative surges can be found in extended expressions of "public purpose" or creedal passion." To put it another way, they can be located in a certain kind of "public mood" that favors change via government action (Some "moods" have that aim; others, as in the private- oriented 1920s, discourage government action). A "mood" seems to be one of those phenomena that drive political scientists to despair by being at once important and elusive. But perhaps something useful can be said. In principle, a "public mood" probably has the following features. First, much of at least the politically aware public, inside and outside Washington, shares a certain outlook about what can and should be done right now on a wide range of political issues. Second, a large number of people who possess that outlook bring considerable intensity to it; they are not lukewarm. Third, to the extent that the outlook calls for it, an appreciable number of people go on to engage in, to use a term that is probably as serviceable as any, citizen action. They actually do things: They may form organizations, persuade others, go to meetings, give money, write letters, join protests, approach members of Congress, in general make themselves heard and felt. Fourth, the outlook in question is in some sense dominant: Non- sharers of it have a hard time wholly resisting its intellectual or political appeal or mustering intensity or action against it... Fifth, a "public mood" has a beginning and an end. The outlook, the intensity, and the citizen action emerge or balloon at some detectable juncture, and then several years later, at another juncture, they deflate or disappear... An anti-government mood may not call for much citizen action, but a mood favoring change through government action requires -or at least seems to be associated with- a great deal. Levers need to be moved." - David Mahew - Divided we Govern
The examples offered by Mayhew of documented decade-long legislative surges that were driven by a palpable "public mood favoring change" included reconstruction in the 1860's, the "progressive"movement in the 1910's, Roosevelt's "New Deal" of the thirties and the civil rights/ womens' rights/environmental and social programs of the LBJ/Nixon era (yes, you read that right - Mayhew documents that the generally liberal legislative surge of that era equally bracket both the LBJ and Nixon presidencies.) The question on the table, is whether the much heralded appetite for "change" that has been promoted by the Obama candidacy and adopted by the McCain candidacy, is in the category of a "public mood favoring change."

If you look at Mayhew's five criteria for a "palpable public mood", it is easy to conclude all the conditions have been met. Certainly if the Obama campaign is used as a proxy for that public mood, we can certainly check off criteria 2 through 5:
#2 - Observable supporter intensity? - Check.
#3 - Large numbers engaging, joining and doing things? - Check.
#4 - Difficult for opposing views to resist? - Well the Clintons will agree, and since McCain adopted rather than fight the mantra - Check.
#5 - The mood has a beginning and an end? - Certainly the beginning is in evidence. - Check.
But then we have criteria #1: A common outlook about what can and should be done right now on a wide range of political issues.

So exactly WTF is it? What specifically is this public political appetite that Obama and McCain are trying to feed? What are the specific political issues that both Obama and McCain supporters broadly agree must be changed right now? The phenomena is real, but do we know what it is really about?

We can ask the candidates. In their acceptance speeches, both candidates endeavored to define and promote the "change" they represent. Obama offered an unremarkable litany of liberal Democratic policy positions. McCain offered an unremarkable litany of conservative Republican policy positions. So each candidate, acutely aware of a "palpable public mood for change", wraps themself in the rhetoric of change, then explicitly pitches the proposition that the same partisan bromides that Republicans and Democrats have been flogging for decades, represent the change that the public seeks. Tough sell.

Here is the rub - Mayhew's criteria specifies that the kind of pervasive public mood for change that results in a real legislative surge, that results in real change, must include broad agreement on what can and should be done across the partisan divide. Do we have that now? Do we have broad agreement on environmental policy? global warming? education policy? taxing policy? deficits and spending policy? judicial appointments? abortion? religious participation in governmental policy? same sex marriage? right to work? Equal pay? Immigration policy? homeland security? I don't think so. So they are all off the list. Moreover, both presidential campaigns are useless at articulating what exactly this "change" means. So we are left to our own devices.

Here is my take on what this inchoate public impulse for "change" really means, and by extension, what this election is really about. Your mileage may vary.

Consensual Change Champions
(In reverse order)

2nd Runner Up - Health Care / Energy Policy (tie)
These are both a close call for me, I profess no certitude about either, but I am saying that they both make the cut. Barely. In both cases, there seems to be a hue and cry in the electorate that "something must be done." For both issues, strong sentiment is generated on both sides of the partisan divide. While there are obvious policy disagreements between Republicans and Democrats on these issues, it is possible to craft a general solution statement with which most Americans will agree. Not an overwhelming majority, but a majority. On health care - most Americans want a solution where people do not fall between the cracks, and are not risking financial ruin to get the care they need. On energy policy, most Americans will agree we need to drill and develop more in America, conserve more, build nukes, and work aggressively to invest in and develop alternative energy sources. Both candidates are missing the boat to some degree on these two issues. McCain and the Republicans are misreading the degree to which Americans are willing to socialize medical care. Obama and the Dems are misreading the degree to which Americans are willing to drill for fossil fuels here and develop nuclear energy as part of the solution.

First Runner-up - The War in Iraq.
12-24 months ago, this was the number one issue that was driving the "change" mantra and the fuel that propelled the Obama candidacy. The change that people wanted, was quite explicit. A large majority of Americans wanted us out of the quagmire of Iraq. If the status of the war in Iraq was the same now as it was then, there would be no contest. Obama would be 20 points ahead in the polls. But events have overtaken the campaign rhetoric and morphed the meaning of "change" in the process.

Violence in Iraq is down, and the Iraqi government has effectively removed the issue from the campaign. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki set a time "horizon" for us to be mostly out by 2011, so - that is going to happen regardless of who is elected president. It is not a presidential campaign issue anymore.

Yes, looking back, Obama was right and McCain was wrong about the war in 2002. But McCain was right and Obama was wrong about the surge in 2006. It is a political wash. The war was the "Change" issue, but now it has been rendered effectively moot. Getting out is still part of the "change" people want, but, looking forward, there is simply no practical difference in the rate at which we can and will redeploy out of Iraq regardless of whether McCain and Obama are elected president. It is even reasonable to postulate that we will be able to reduce our military footprint faster with a McCain presidency. The only difference between the candidates on Iraq, is the rhetoric they use to posture for their respective base.

Change Champion - Exorcise the Bush administration, and punish incumbent Republicans.
That is it. That is what is left of the "pervasive public mood for change" mandate, once the issue of the war in Iraq was rendered moot by Maliki. There is broad agreement among Americans that the occupation of Iraq was a mistake, that the strategic execution of the war was flawed, and the Bush administration was largely incompetent (see - he was a uniter not a divider!) Blame for the war falls squarely on the Bush administration, enabled by a gutless, ethics challenged, mostly Republican Congress. The punishment for the Republicans will be meted out in the congressional elections. It is very possible that the Democrats will finish with a 100 seat majority in the House of Representatives, and secure a filibuster-proof 60/40 majority in the Senate. The Republican party may well be rendered impotent as a opposition party in Congress. So that leaves the presidency.

The issue that is now determinative in that contest, is whether the electorate believes that McCain/Palin is an extension of the Bush administration. If the Obama campaign succeeds in painting that picture (hence the oft-repeated "McCain is 90% Bush" canard), Obama wins. If McCain succeeds in separating himself from Bush and painting himself as a maverick, the "pervasive public mood for change" does not hurt him, and may even help his candidacy. Early indications are that his acceptance speech and the Palin pick accomplished exactly that.

Which means we may still have a change election, but it may be John McCain that leads it.

Divided and Balanced.™ Now that is fair.